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Dissipative Advertising Signals Quality 





Economists have emphasized the role of dissipative advertising and price as signals of quality. 
Most works, however, limit the number of types to two options: high and low quality. Yet, 
production costs and quality both result from R&D efforts and therefore are both uncertain. I 
characterize the optimal separating marketing mix (price and advertising) when quality and 
marginal cost are both subject to chance. In a static framework (no repeat purchases and no 
informed consumers), advertising appears to be necessary together with price to signal 
quality. Equilibrium profits depend on cost but not on quality: all rents are dissipated for 
signaling purpose. 
JEL Code: L12, L15, M37. 
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The producer of a new experience good of high quality has to signal its status to consumers.1
For some products, direct and credible signals of quality as certiﬁcation or warranties are
available. Otherwise, a ﬁrm has to resort to indirect signals. Following Nelson (1974)
and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) the economic literature emphasizes the role of dissipative
advertising and price as signals of quality. Dissipative advertising is like burning money
in public: it does not directly aﬀect demand (neither persuasive nor informative content),2
and it is observed by all potential buyers. Nelson, Milgrom and Roberts, and others use the
generic example of a celebrity endorsing a brand in a commercial rather than an anonymous
actress/actor. In Nelson’s argument, advertising is a quality signal because only a higher
quality ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to spend a large amount on advertising thanks to repeat
purchases. In the short run, advertising attracts consumers whether quality is high or
low but its cost, if large enough, cannot be recouped immediately. Only through repeat
purchases can a high quality ﬁrm cash in on advertising while repeat purchases are not
accessible to a ﬂight by night lower quality ﬁrm.
In this paper, repeat purchases are absent or too far away.3 In a static framework, a ﬁrm
can still resort to advertising when a proportion of consumers is informed about quality
as in Linnemer (2002) in a model à la Bagwell and Riordan (1991). However, without
informed consumers, the analysis of the two type model (See Bagwell (2007a)) shows that
dissipative advertising is not an eﬀective signal.
The classical model postulates two quality levels (high and low) and one marginal cost
of production for each level. That is, a one to one relationship between quality and cost is
assumed.4 Yet, even if marginal cost can, on average, be expected to increase with quality,
a one to one relationship is a very restrictive assumption. In particular, for a new product
(for which the problem of signaling quality is the most acute) the cost of production results
of uncertain R&D eﬀorts and for a given quality, marginal costs can be, a priori, more or
less important. Even if the chances are small, it is possible that a higher quality good costs
less than a lower quality one. Or the other way around: for a given cost, diﬀerent qualities
1A good is said to be an experience good if its quality is known only after consumption (see Nelson
(1970)). If quality is not even disclosed after consumption (some medical acts, or mechanical repairs) the
good is referred to as a credence good (Darby and Karni (1973)), see Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006).
2The bare fact that advertising contains little information is observed for many products besides expe-
rience goods. Anderson and Renault (2006) model explicitly advertising content in a search model where
consumers are imperfectly informed about the characteristics (price and matching value) of a good unless
they go to the shop (at a cost) or they receive informative enough advertising. They show that a monopolist
prefers to convey only limited product information if possible.
3For example, for a durable good. But also when repeat purchases and future purchases in general are
not linked to the number of consumers who buy in the introductory period. For instance, if information
about the product quality spreads out very quickly through word of mouth or consumer reports. Then the
problem of a high quality ﬁrm is only to signal itself in the short run. Finally, the static model applies to
a credence good.
4Typically, the relationship is increasing: the higher the quality the higher the cost. However, as marginal
cost can also be decreasing with quality (for example when a new technology is introduced) a decreasing
relationship has also been considered. Wilson (1985) extends Milgrom and Roberts (1986) to a continuum
of types but he still assumes an increasing (one to one) relationship between marginal cost and quality.
2can be expected.
To take into account a variance in the distribution of marginal costs, for a given quality,
more than two types are needed and types should be diﬀerentiated in both dimensions:
quality and marginal cost. A priori, there is no reason to restrict the number of types and
the most direct (if not natural) way is to assume a type to be a pair (c,q) composed of
a marginal cost c and a quality level q. Both c and q are allowed to vary continuously.
Consumers are able to observe neither c nor q but share a priori beliefs about their joint
distribution and revise these beliefs after observing the price and advertising expenditures.
In such a static model, the proﬁt function of a high quality type does not directly
depends on its quality but only of consumers’ beliefs about it. This makes imitation ﬁerce.
In comparison, in Milgrom and Roberts’ model repeat purchases imply that the proﬁt
function depends both on consumers’ beliefs and on the true quality (through the repeat
purchases). In Bagwell and Riordan’s model also proﬁts depends on both beliefs and true
quality due to the informed consumers. In the static framework only beliefs matter which
makes imitation easier and separation more costly.5
The main result of the paper is that the additional uncertainty in terms of marginal
costs makes dissipative advertising a necessary signal. That the monopoly has to resort to
advertising contrasts with the two-type (but otherwise similar) model where (generically)
advertising is not used. Therefore, it provides a new (and somehow simpler) explanation of
Nelson’s idea that advertising is a signal of quality.
Besides advertising, separation entails a distortion in price from the perfect informa-
tion monopoly price. In the two-types static model, the price is distorted upwards (resp.
downwards) if the low-quality marginal cost is lower (resp. greater) than the high-quality
marginal cost. The intuition being that a price increase (resp. decrease) is more costly
for a low (resp. high) marginal cost ﬁrm. With a continuum of low-quality marginal costs
this intuition fails as a high quality type needs to diﬀerentiate from below and from above.
Yet, the direction of the price distortion can be determined. Under the (rather natural)
assumption that (for a given marginal cost) the monopoly quantity increases with quality,
the price is distorted upwards: The separating price is larger than the perfect information
price.6
In any case, the separating price increases with both marginal cost and quality. The
equilibrium amount of advertising increases with quality (for a given marginal cost) and
decreases with marginal cost (for a given quality). More eﬃcient types (in terms of both
lower cost and higher quality) advertise more. Finally, at the unique separating equilibrium
of the game, all rents due to a higher quality are dissipated: the equilibrium proﬁt depends
only on the marginal cost but not on the quality.
Even if for a given price, consumers care only about quality, they use their information
about the potential value of the ﬁrm’s marginal cost to infer quality and in equilibrium
types are separating along both cost and quality dimensions. Hence the paper contributes
to the small literature on signaling multiple dimensions with many signals. Quinzii and
Rochet (1985) focus on a Spence signalling model with a discrete number of characteristics
5I am very grateful to Kyle Bagwell for pointing out this property.
6The reverse holds if the monopoly quantity decreases with quality.
3and a corresponding number of investments in education. They characterize the separating
equilibrium for signalling cost function linear and separable in the signals. Their analysis is
extended in Engers (1987). More recently and in relation with the advertising, in Linnemer
(1998) and Bagwell (2007b) limit-pricing games are studied with bi-dimensional incumbent’s
types. In Linnemer (1998) an incumbent can be of low or high quality and if of high quality
of low or high cost. Two kind of hidden information have to be signalled to two diﬀerent
audiences: quality to the consumers and marginal cost to a potential entrant. Two signals
are used: price and dissipative advertising. In Bagwell (2007b), the incumbent can be more
or less patient (two possible values of the discount factor) and its marginal cost can be
either low or high. A low-cost incumbent would like to signal it to a potential entrant.
The entrant is not directly interested by the level of patience of the incumbent but this
dimension of the private information plays an important role for the characterization of the
equilibria. Two signals are also used: price and demand-enhancing advertising.
Literature related to Nelson (1974):7 Schmalensee (1978) challenges Nelson’s rea-
soning on the grounds that consumers rationality is bounded. Kihlstrom and Riordan
(1984) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) embed Nelson’s idea in formal signaling games.8
In particular, Milgrom and Roberts dissect how a monopoly uses both price and advertising
to signal its quality while maximizing its proﬁt. Milgrom and Roberts is a keystone paper
in the literature on advertising as a signal as it shows how to select (quite generally) a
unique separating equilibrium from many through the elimination of dominated strategies.
Milgrom and Roberts (1986) (section II) analyses a speciﬁc example where the authors do
not assume a particular ranking of the marginal costs. In the presence of repeat purchases,
they show that if the high quality marginal cost is lower than the low quality one then a low
price without any advertising signals quality. When the marginal cost increases with qual-
ity, however, advertising, in addition to price, can help to optimally signal quality.9 On the
dissenting side Hertzendorf (1993) argues that, if advertising is imperfectly observed by con-
sumers, then price and advertising expenditure cannot be used in combination. Horstmann
and MacDonald (1994) put forward an alternative model of quality signaling by assuming
imperfect consumer learning and show that advertising signals quality rather for established
products than newly introduced ones.
Fluet and Garella (2002) and Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) present a duopoly
model where ﬁrms know each other’s types and where price and advertising might be used
in a separating equilibrium.10
7For a thorough survey of this literature see Bagwell (2007a), in particular section 6 on quality.
8In a monopolistic kind of competition model, Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) distinguish two cases: lower
or larger marginal cost for high quality relatively to low quality (overall due to ﬁxed cost of production high
quality is more costly). They ﬁnd that if high quality increases ﬁxed costs but not marginal costs (relative
to low quality ) then advertising can be part of a signal in equilibrium. If, however, higher quality raises
marginal costs, then advertising is not used in equilibrium.
9Moreover, they also introduce the use of the Cho and Kreps (1987) criterion to eliminate pooling
equilibria.
10In Daughety and Reinganum (2007b) ﬁrms signal their quality (low or high) in an oligopoly framework
using only prices (the model is static). All low quality (resp. high quality) ﬁrms have the same marginal
cost. Contrary to the papers of Fluet and Garella and Hertzendorf and Overgaard, a ﬁrm does not know the
types of its rivals. See also, Daughety and Reinganum (2007a) where similar price strategies signal quality
4On the empirical front, several old studies (see Bagwell (2007a), section 3.2.5 for more
details) provide only mixed support for the role of price and advertising as signals of quality.
This does not necessarily come as a surprise given that the quality-signaling theory is mainly
relevant for new products (at least for products for which a large proportion of consumers
are not aware of quality) and as pointed out by Horstmann and MacDonald (2003) because
it is diﬃcult to assess quality (that is the experience quality component of the quality of a
product: a good can have very high consumer report rating, for example, because of high
search quality. In most of the goods search and experience quality coexist.) Yet, at least
three recent studies support the idea that dissipative advertising plays a role in signaling
quality. Thomas, Shane, and Weigelt (1998) use data on the U.S. automobile industry and
ﬁnd that manufacturers resort to both price and advertising to signal the quality of their
product. Horstmann and MacDonald (2003) examine data they have collected on compact
disc players over 1983-1992. Their focus is on the dynamics of price and advertising through
time. They ﬁnd that price falls with the age of the product and that advertising follows
an inverted U-shape (these results are in line with the theoretical prediction of Linnemer
(2002)). Iizuka (2004) uses a panel data set containing more than 600 drug-year observations
over 1996-1999. His purpose is not to test Nelson’s theory but he ﬁnds that ﬁrms are more
likely to advertise newer and higher quality drugs rather than older and lower quality ones.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and the structural
assumptions. Section 3 shows the existence of a unique separating equilibrium which is
characterized. A comparative static analysis is performed in Section 4. Conclusions are
drawn in Section 5.
2 The model
A ﬁrm has just developed a new product for which it enjoys a monopoly situation. The
quality of the good can be more or less important. Moreover, for each quality level, the
marginal cost of production can take several values. The extensive form of the game is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Nature chooses the type t = (c,q) of the ﬁrm where q denote the quality of the good
and c the marginal cost of production which is assumed to be constant. The type t is
distributed on the set T = [c,c]×[0,1] according to an a priori distribution function F(.,.)
such that any pair (c,q) has a positive probability to be chosen by Nature.
The origin of the studied problem lies in the asymmetric information about the type
of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm knows its type t while consumers are only aware of the a priori
distribution of t. The ﬁrm strategy is to choose a price p and an advertising expenditure
A. Consumers observe the pair (p,A) and revise in a Bayesian way their initial beliefs
in a duopoly (no dissipative advertising is allowed). In both Daughety and Reinganum’s papers, the price
increase needed to signal quality is like a collusive device as from the ﬁrms point of view, prices are too
low under perfect information. Such an eﬀect is absent in a monopoly setting. Yehezkel (2007) introduces
informed consumers in a duopoly setting and identiﬁes (though assuming that marginal cost do not depend
on quality) the optimal price and dissipative advertising choices that ensure separation. Thus he combines
a duopoly model à la Fluet and Garella/Hertzendorf and Overgaard with an informed consumer model à
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about the type of the ﬁrm. Given the price and their beliefs, consumers take their buying
decisions. There is only one period.
Let Dq (p) denote the perfect information demand function if quality is q and price p.
Assumption 1. Demand functions are continuous and non increasing with respect to price
and not null everywhere. Moreover, demand is increasing with quality: if q,q0 ∈ [0,1] with
q < q0, then, for all p, Dq (p) < Dq0 (p) (wherever Dq0(p) > 0).
Let
Π(p,c,q) − A = (p − c)Dq (p) − A
denote the perfect information proﬁt function of type t = (c,q). A key point of the model
is that in a static framework, this proﬁt function is also the proﬁt function of any type
t = (c,.) when it is believed by consumers to produce a good of quality q with certainty.11
That is, under asymmetric information the proﬁt function of a type (c,.) depends on its
marginal cost and on the perceived quality but not on its true quality.
The following assumption ensures that the proﬁts are maximum for a unique price.
Assumption 2. For all c,q, the proﬁt function Π(p,c,q) is strictly quasi-concave in p.
Let Pm(c,q) denote the price that maximises Π(p,c,q). For example, if information
is perfect, Pm(c,q) is the monopoly price set by a ﬁrm of type t = (c,q). If, however,
information is imperfect a ﬁrm of type t = (c,q) which is perceived as producing quality q0
would maximise its proﬁts by setting p = Pm(c,q0). Moreover, let
Πm(c,q) = Π(Pm(c,q),c,q)
denote the value of the maximum proﬁt under perfect information. Notice that as the focus
is on dissipative advertising and not on demand enhancing advertising, advertising is not
used under perfect information.
To focus on the role of dissipative advertising as a signal of quality, the analysis
concentrates on separating equilibria only. Formally, a separating equilibrium is a list:
11This property does not hold in a model with repeat purchases as they are conditioned on the real
quality, nor when some consumers are informed about the true quality.
6{(pt,At)}t∈T, such that: for all t 6= t0, (pt,At) 6= (pt0,At0), when (pt,At) is observed con-
sumers believe (Bayesian revision) with probability 1 that the ﬁrm is of type t. Outside
the equilibrium path, that is, if a pair (p,A) is observed which corresponds to none of the
equilibrium expected strategies, then (arbitrarily) consumers think that quality is the low-
est one: q = 0. To form an equilibrium, each pair (pt,At) maximizes type t proﬁt function
given consumers’s beliefs.12
In a separating equilibrium, all lowest quality types select their perfect information
prices and have no use of dissipative advertising. Indeed, in a separating equilibrium
consumers rightly infer quality, their quality is q = 0 which mean they face the worst
possible beliefs and a deviation to Pm(c,0) would always be proﬁtable if it were not the
equilibrium price. Consequently, if a separating equilibrium exists, then for all t = (c,0)
(pt,At) = (Pm(c,0),0).
It remains to characterize the separating equilibrium strategies of all the other types. A
usual assumption in such a signaling game is that the perfect information monopoly prices
(and no advertising) are not separating. With a continuum of low-quality types, however,
this assumption is automatically true. Indeed, a type (c,0) always gains to post Pm(c,q)
(and to spend nothing on advertising) if such a strategy makes consumers believe that
quality is q as Assumption 1 implies that Πm(c,q) > Πm(c,0).13
3 Separating equilibrium
To characterize the separating equilibrium it is convenient to ﬁrst study a game where the
set of types is limited as follows. Let assume, as shown by Figure 2, a continuum of types at
the lowest quality level: t = (γ,0) with γ ∈ [c,c] but only one other type. The quality level
of this “high” quality type is denoted q > 0 and its marginal cost is denoted c, c ∈ [c,c].
This conﬁguration is key to derive further results.
Proposition 1. In a game with a continuum of lowest quality types and one high quality
type (c,q), c < c < c there exists a unique separating marketing mix (P∗,A∗) where P∗ =
D−1
q [D0 (Pm(c,0))] and A∗ = Π(P∗,c,q)−Πm(c,0) > 0. The equilibrium proﬁt of the high
quality type is Πm(c,0).
If c = c or c = c the separating equilibrium strategy described above is still valid but it
is no longer unique.
Proof. The proof relies on the elimination of dominated strategies. For a type (γ,0), let
P(γ,q) < P(γ,q) be respectively the lowest and largest solution of the equation:
Π(p,γ,q) = Πm(γ,0)
and let
A(p,γ,q) = max{0; Π(p,γ,q) − Πm(γ,0)}
12Note that as the separation of types in terms of marginal cost has no value for consumers, one could
look at semi-separating equilibria where types are only separated in terms of quality. However, types of the
same quality but diﬀerent marginal cost will be separated at the unique separating equilibrium.
13By continuity there exists ε > 0 such that for all γ ∈ ]c − ε,c + ε[, a type (γ,0) would gain by using
the strategy (P









Figure 2: A continuum of types with q = 0 and one other type
Any strategy (p,A) such that A > A(p,γ,q) is strictly dominated for type (γ,0) by the
strategy (Pm(γ,0),0). The construction of the function A(p,γ,q) from which dominated
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The elimination of the dominated strategies means that the type (c,q) can maximize
its proﬁt under the constraint that given its price p its advertising expenditure A is larger
than Aq(p). Indeed, if A ≥ Aq(p), then for all γ, A ≥ A(p,γ,q) and no type (γ,0) ﬁnds it
more proﬁtable to chose (p,A) rather than (Pm(γ,0),0). Moreover, as advertising is costly,
it is optimal for type (c,q) to choose A = Aq(p). Using the envelop theorem, Appendix A
8shows that
Aq(p) = A(p,min{max{c,b c},c},q)
where b c is the solution in γ of the equation Dq(p) = D0 (Pm(γ,0)). The advertising function
Aq(p) can be null if p is lower (respectively larger) than P(c,q) (resp. P(c,q)).




In Appendix B, it is shown that the solution P∗ is such that b c(P∗) = c and is given by
Dq (P∗) = D0 (Pm(c,0))
It follows that
A∗ = Aq(P∗) = Π(P∗,c,q) − Πm(c,0) > 0
and substituting A∗ by its value, the equilibrium proﬁt of the high quality type writes
Π(P∗,c,q) − A∗ = Πm(c,0)
which proves that type (c,q) has no incentive to deviate from its equilibrium strategy, as a
deviation would at most lead to a proﬁt of Πm(c,0).
Appendix C details the other separating equilibria for c = c or c. These additional
separating strategies are neglected in the remaining of the paper without loss of generality.
Proposition 1 shows that a type (c,q) is able to signal itself but separation cost is
maximal: its equilibrium proﬁt is exactly what it would be if consumers believed quality
is the lowest. The intuition is that with a continuum of types to separate from, the (c,q)
type has to separate from its evil twin (c,0): same marginal cost but lowest quality. More
precisely in equilibrium the incentive compatibility constraint of the evil twin has to be
binding that is Π(p,c,q)−Aq(p) has to be equal to Πm(c,0) otherwise the (c,0) type would
gain imitating the strategy of type (c,q). Therefore the separating price P∗ has to be such
that (c,0) is the low-quality type which gains the most by imitating (c,q). This happens
(see Appendix A) when Dq (P∗) = D0 (Pm(c,0)) which characterizes the separating price
P∗. Thus, at the (unique) separating equilibrium, type (c,q) and (c,0) produce the same
quantity and consequently type (c,q) posts a greater price than (c,0). Finally, separation
from the evil twin is the most costly and type (c,q) achieve the same proﬁt as type (c,0).
How does this result compare with the usual two type model? Assume that there are
only two types denoted (without loss of generality) (γ,0) and (c,q) with q > 0. If γ 6= c then
a unique separating equilibrium exists: p∗∗ = P(γ,q) and a∗∗ = 0 if γ < c and p∗∗ = P(γ,q)
and a∗∗ = 0 if γ > c. At these unique equilibria, the high quality type makes more proﬁt





a∗∗ = A(p∗∗,c,q) but for all these equilibria the high quality type proﬁt is Πm(c,0). This
case is illustrated by Figure 4a. Here, as in the more general model of the paper, advertising
can be part of the separating strategy. Yet, to see that it is an mere artefact, consider the
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bold curve : Π(p,c,q) − Aq(p)
Figure 4b: Continuum of types
(p∗∗,a∗∗) → (P(c,q),0) while if γ → c+ then (p∗∗,a∗∗) → (P(c,q),0). In both cases, there
is no dissipative advertising.
With a continuum of low quality types, the high quality type is no longer indiﬀerent
between a continuum of separating strategies. As shown by Figure 4b, only one price in 
P(c,q),P(c,q)

combined with the right advertising amount allows both separation and
a proﬁt of at least Πm(c,0).14 Here, one can discretize the set of low-quality types by
considering b low-quality types with a marginal cost strictly below c and a low-quality
types with a marginal cost strictly above c (see Appendix D). For each discretization of the
continuous game, the separating equilibrium strategy is unique, results of the elimination





positive level of advertising. This unique separating equilibrium of the discrete low-quality
type model converges to the strategy (P∗,A∗) of Proposition 1. That is, the equilibrium
use of advertising is not an artefact of the presence of the evil twin (or to put it diﬀerently
an artefact of the inﬁnite set of types): advertising is positive at the limit but also along
the sequence.
The results of Proposition 1 can be extended immediately to the case of a continuum
of types at both levels: 0 and q. As stated in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. In a game with a continuum of lowest quality types (γ,0) and a continuum
of higher quality type (c,q), there exists a (unique) separating equilibrium. The marketing
mix chosen by type (c,q) is (P∗(c,q),A∗(c,q)) where P∗(c,q) = D−1
q [D0 (Pm(c,0))] and
A∗(c,q) = Π(P∗,c,q) − Πm(c,0) > 0. The equilibrium proﬁt of a higher quality type is
Πm(c,0).
Proof. If types (c,q) play (P∗(c,q),A∗(c,q)) there is no incentive for any type (γ,0) to
deviate from its equilibrium strategy. A particular type (c,q) as no incentive to chose a
14At ﬁrst, it might be surprising that type (c,q) distorts its price and does not post its perfect information
monopoly price P
m(c,q). Indeed, once it has be recognized the incentive compatibility constraint of type
(c,0) is binding, it seems that as in the two-type model several combinations of price and advertising allow
type (c,q) to reach the same proﬁt. Yet, type (c,q) has also to separate itself from the other types, and for
most prices it is not (c,0) which is the most eager to imitate (c,q) but another low-quality type.
10pair (P∗(c0,q),A∗(c0,q)). Indeed, it does not improve consumers’ perception of its quality
(they still believe quality is q) but it reduces its proﬁts. To see why notice that the function
Aq(p) does only depend on q but not on c. It remains to check that for c 6= c0 then
(P∗(c,q),A∗(c,q)) 6= (P∗(c0,q),A∗(c0,q)) which is true as P∗(c,q) 6= P∗(c0,q).
The intuition behind Corollary 1 is that the incentives for type (γ,q) to imitate a fellow
quality type (c,q) are weaker than the incentives of its evil twin (γ,0) (in fact in equilibrium
it has exactly the same incentives) and therefore once type (c,q) is separated from all low-
quality types, it is also separated from its fellow quality types. What remains to be checked
is that all quality types use diﬀerent strategies (no partial pooling) and this is done in the
proof of the Corollary.
Finally Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 are generalized for types distributed over an entire
square.
Corollary 2. In a game with types (c,q) ∈ [c,c] × [0,1], there exists a (unique) separating
equilibrium. The marketing mix chosen by type (c,q) if q > 0 is (P∗(c,q),A∗(c,q)) where
P∗(c,q) = D−1
q [D0 (Pm(c,0))] and A∗(c,q) = Π(P∗,c,q) − Πm(c,0) > 0. The equilibrium
proﬁt of any type (c,q) is Πm(c,0).
Proof. From Corollary 1 no type (γ,0) has an incentive to deviate. Could a type (c,q),
q > 0 gain by choosing a strategy (P∗(c0,q0),A∗(c0,q0))? In equilibrium type (c,q) proﬁt is
Πm(c,0) that is exactly the same proﬁt as type (c,0). Notice that if a strategy (p,a) makes
consumers believe that the quality level is q0 then by choosing this strategy, both types (c,q)
and (c,0) obtain the same proﬁt, namely Π(p,c,q0) − a. Therefore if (P∗(c0,q0),A∗(c0,q0))
is not a proﬁtable deviation for type (c,0) (Proposition 1) it is also not proﬁtable for type
(c,q).
It remains to check that for (c,q) 6= (c0,q0) then (P∗(c,q),A∗(c,q)) 6= (P∗(c0,q0),A∗(c0,q0)).
In the proof of Corollary 1, it has been shown that two types (c,q) and (c0,q) (with c 6= c0)
do not have the same prices. Assume that two types (c,q) and (c0,q0) (with c 6= c0 and
q 6= q0) have the same price: P∗(c,q) = P∗(c0,q0), then their advertising expenditures would
be diﬀerent as for a given price Aq(p), which does not depend on c, is increasing with q.
Corollary 2 describes the unique separating equilibrium (once dominated strategies are
eliminated and if one neglect that for c = c or c = c other equilibrium strategies are
possible). The rent dissipation result of Proposition 1 extends to the most general set up
where types are distributed over a square. The intuition is that once a type (c,q) separates
itself from all low-quality types it de facto separates itself from other (γ,q0) types. Formally,
it is obvious that the separating equilibrium of Corollary 2 is intuitive in the sense of Cho-
Kreps as in this equilibrium, all types (γ,.) achieve the same proﬁt (irrespectively of their
true quality). Therefore one cannot ﬁnd a deviation that would be equilibrium dominated
by type (γ,0) (for example) but not for type (γ,q).
An interesting question not addressed in this paper is the shape of pooling equilibria if
they exist. This question is, however, diﬀerent from the one of the paper which is: does
dissipative advertising signals quality in a static framework? Indeed, to study pooling or
semi-pooling equilibrium one would typically assumed away dissipative advertising. Notice
11that in non-separating equilibria, the property that proﬁt functions do not directly depend
on the true quality still holds. A semi-pooling equilibrium where all types (c,.) post the
same price, if it exists (existence would depend on speciﬁc assumptions on the distribution
of the types over the square), should be intuitive in the sense of Cho-Kreps. Indeed, if a
deviation is equilibrium dominated for a type (c,q) it is also equilibrium dominated by any
other type (c,q0).
4 Comparative statics
In this section, comparative static analysis of the separating equilibrium are derived. First,
does signaling entails an upward or a downward price distortion? With only two types of
quality, the answer depends on marginal cost being increasing or decreasing with quality. If
it is increasing (resp. decreasing), then the price is distorted upwards (resp. downwards).
With types heterogeneous in terms of both quality and marginal costs, the price distortion
rather depends on quite a diﬀerent property as shown in Corollary 3.
Corollary 3. The separating equilibrium price P∗(c,q) is greater than the perfect informa-
tion monopoly price Pm(c,q) if and only if (for a given marginal cost) the perfect infor-
mation monopoly quantity increases with quality (formally if and only if D0 (Pm(c,0)) <
Dq (Pm(c,q))).
Proof. From Dq (P∗) = D0 (Pm(c,0)) it is clear that D0 (Pm(c,0)) < Dq (Pm(c,q)) implies
Dq (P∗) < Dq (Pm(c,q)) and therefore P∗(c,q) > Pm(c,q). And conversely if D0 (Pm(c,0)) >
Dq (Pm(c,q)).
The most natural assumption is that (given that marginal cost remains the same) the
monopoly quantity increases with quality.15 In that case, the price distortion is always
upward whereas low quality types produce with both lower and greater marginal cost than
type (c,q). That is, even if on average the distribution of types is such that marginal cost
is decreasing with quality, the signaling price remains above the perfect information price.
This result is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Thomas, Shane, and Weigelt (1998):
“manufacturers of high quality autos set price above the full information price”.
Next, how do the equilibrium price and advertising expenditure vary with quality and
marginal cost?
Corollary 4. The separating equilibrium price P∗(c,q) is increasing with c and q. The
separating equilibrium advertising expenditure A∗(c,q) is increasing with q, decreasing with
c if D0 (Pm(c,0)) < Dq (Pm(c,q)) and increasing otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix E
15Let P(x,q) denote the inverse demand function and let MR(x,q) = P(x,q)+x
∂P
∂x denote the marginal
revenue. The monopoly quantity x






∂q = 0. As
∂MR
∂x < 0 (by the second order condition), then
∂xm
∂q is of the same sign as
∂MR
∂q .
If the marginal revenue is increasing with quality, then also the monopoly quantity. For a Mussa-Rosen
demand function, P = q(1 − x) one can directly compute x
m =
1
2 (1 − c/q) which is increasing with q.
12The separating price follow a pattern similar to the perfect information monopoly price
as both increase with marginal cost. If it is assumed that the monopoly price increases
with quality, then both prices also vary similarly with quality.
Advertising increases with quality. This property is not obvious as the advertising
function Aq(p) (the minimal separating advertising amount) follows an inverted U-shape.
Therefore as price vary, advertising could increase or decrease. Yet, in equilibrium higher
quality means larger advertising expenditures. Again this is in line with Thomas, Shane, and
Weigelt (1998) who ﬁnd that manufacturers of high quality cars spend more on advertising
than manufacturers of low quality products. They present this result as broadly consistent
with Milgrom and Roberts (1986) but with only two quality levels only the high quality
should advertise. This is also compatible with the study of Iizuka (2004) who ﬁnds that
ﬁrms are more likely to advertise newer and higher quality drugs rather than older and lower
quality ones. Finally, if the monopoly quantity increases (resp. decreases) with quality, then
advertising decreases (resp. increases) with the marginal cost.
From an empirical point of view, once no one to one relationship between costs and
quality is assumed, one has to be careful when estimating how advertising (resp. price)
varies with quality (resp. cost) to control for cost level (resp. quality level). This makes
empirical studies diﬃcult to interpret when cost data are not available.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that the usual assumption made in the quality-signaling literature that
quality can only be of two types (low or high) is restrictive. The main result is that
dissipative advertising has to be part of the optimal marketing mix in presence of types
heterogeneous in terms of both quality and marginal costs. Previous literature focused on
whether repeat purchases or a proportion of informed consumers to explain the rational use
of dissipative advertising.
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[max{0; Π(p,γ,q) − Πm(γ,0)}]
Let H(γ) = Π(p,γ,q) − Πm(γ,0) = Π(p,γ,q) − maxz [(z − γ)D0(z)], using the envelop
theorem, it comes that





As the perfect information monopoly price increases with γ and demand decreases in price
H00 < 0. Therefore if the equation H0(γ) = 0 has a solution it characterizes a maximum.
Let c∗ denote the value of the marginal cost such that Aq(p) = A(p,c∗,q).
Let pmin and pmax be such that
Dq(pmin) = D0 (Pm(c,0)) and Dq(pmax) = D0 (Pm(c,0)) (2)
If pmin ≤ p ≤ pmax, then c∗ = b c where b c is the unique γ solution of
D0 (Pm(γ,0)) = Dq(p)
15while if p < pmin (resp.pmax < p) , then c∗ = c (resp. c∗ = c) as in that case H0(γ) < 0
(resp. H0(γ) > 0) for all γ which shows that
Aq(p) = A(p,min{max{c,b c},c},q)
Notice that when c∗ = b c, then
H(b c) = (p − b c)Dq (p) − Πm(b c,0)
= (p − b c)Dq (p) − (Pm(b c,0) − b c)D0 (Pm(b c,0))
= (p − b c)Dq (p) − (Pm(b c,0) − b c)Dq (p)
= (p − Pm(b c,0))Dq (p)
B Characterization of the separating price
To ﬁnd the solution of
max
p Π(p,c,q) − Aq(p)
Note that




−(c − c)Dq(p) + Πm(c,0) if p < pmin
(Pm(b c,0) − c)Dq(p) if pmin ≤ p ≤ pmax
(c − c)Dq(p) + Πm(c,0) if pmax < p
where pmin and pmax are deﬁned in Appendix A.
For c > c (resp. c < c) , −(c − c)Dq(p) (resp. (c − c)Dq(p))is an increasing (resp.
decreasing) function of p. Therefore the maximum has to be found for pmin ≤ p ≤ pmax.
Let G(p) = (Pm(b c,0) − c)Dq(p), where b c is a function of p deﬁned by D0 (Pm(b c,0)) =






0 (Pm(b c,0)) = D0
q(p)
on the other hand by deﬁnition of Pm(b c,0) one has
(Pm(b c,0) − b c)D0































(Pm(b c,0) − b c)D0
q(p)

+ (Pm(b c,0) − c)D0
q(p)
= −(c − b c)D0
q(p)
that is (as p is such that D0
q < 0)
G0(p) = 0 ⇔ b c = c ⇔ D0 (Pm(c,0)) = Dq(p)
16C Separating equilibria for extreme cost values
If the high quality type is (c,q) (resp. (c,q)) then it has no low quality type with a lower
(resp. higher) marginal cost and equation 2 shows that pmin = P∗ (resp. pmax = P∗.
Therefore for all p < P∗ (resp. p > P∗) a type (c,q) (resp. (c,q)) has to spend A(p,c,q)
(resp. A(p,c,q)) on advertising which means its proﬁt is constant on [P(c,q),P∗] (resp. 
P∗,P(c,q)


















Figure 5b: Equilibria when c = c
D Model with a discrete number of low-quality types
Only one high-quality type (c,q) is assumed. Let B = {l1,...,lb} denote the set of low-
quality types with a marginal cost below c and A = {L1,...,La} the set of low-quality
types with a marginal cost above c. Without loss of generality it is assumed that cl1 <
cl2 < ··· < clb < c < cL1 < ··· < cLa.
The elimination of the dominated strategies for each low quality type remains identical
as the one described in the proof of Proposition 1. The high-quality type can after the
elimination of the dominated strategies maximize its proﬁt under the constraint of spending





This elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique separating marketing mix
(P∗ (clb,cL1),A∗ (clb,cL1)) such that P∗ (clb,cL1) is the unique solution of A(p,clb,q) =
A(p,cL1,q) and A(clb,cL1)
∗ = A(P∗,clb,q) = A(P∗,cL1,q) > 0.
That is, the separating equilibrium strategy depends only on the largest marginal cost
in B and on the lowest marginal cost in A. Indeed, as long as the minimal separating
17advertising level A(p,γ,q) corresponds to a marginal cost lower than c the objective of the
high quality type is
Π(p,c,q) − A(p,γ,q) = −(c − γ)Dq(p) + Πm(γ,0)
which is increasing with the price as c > γ. Conversely when the minimal advertising
function corresponds to marginal cost larger than c the objective of the high quality type
is
Π(p,c,q) − A(p,γ,q) = (γ − c)Dq(p) + Πm(γ,0)
which is decreasing with the price as γ > c. The optimal price is necessary at the (unique)
intersection of A(p,clb,q) and A(p,cL1,q). That is, it is given by
(cL1 − cla)Dq (P∗) = Πm(cla,0) − Πm(cL1,0)
One can check that the separating equilibrium proﬁt of the high quality type is strictly
larger than Πm (c,0).
Finally with more and more low quality types, both cla and cL1 tend to c. The above
equation being continuous in cL1 one can make cL1 = c. Making cla tend to c the above
equation writes:






Let Ψ(γ) = maxp [(p − γ)D0(p)]. The above equation writes:






= −Ψ0(c) = D0 (Pm(c,0))
as in Proposition 1.
E Proof of Corollary 4
From





























































































therefore the sign of ∂A∗
∂c is the same as the sign of ∂Π
∂p evaluated at P∗. If P∗(c,q) > Pm(c,q)
then ∂Π
∂p < 0 while it is positive otherwise.
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